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Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing
Domestic Violence
Kristen M. DriskeZZ*
I.

INTRODUCTION: MOVING IN

Victims of domestic violence who are fleeing their abusers frequently
seek to relocate and change their names, their addresses, and their very
identities in order to start a new life, free from violence. Helping these
women 1 achieve a fresh start presents a new legal problem: How to resolve
the conflict between maintaining publicly accessible records and
guaranteeing victims' safety by keeping confidential the names, addresses,
and other traditionally public records of victims who fear being tracked by
their abusers. Legislative concerns about fraudulent use of confidentiality
programs and custodial interference by women fleeing with their children
in violation of a custody order further complicate an already complex
situation and make it nearly impossible to achieve an easy solution.
The statistics on domestic violence present a stark picture of a social
problem. The Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") recorded 5 million
reported incidents of domestic violence each year, with 2 million resulting
in injuries and 1,300 in death.2 One in three women was abused by an
intimate partner at some time in her life. 3 And domestic violence does not
simply affect the victim - abusers, too, may feel the repercussions of their
actions when their victims unexpectedly react to violence with violence.
Several homicide cases have raised Battered Woman Syndrome as a

• J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., June 2006, University of California, San Diego. The author would especially like to
thank Professor D. Kelly Weisberg for her invaluable guidance and input throughout the
writing process.
I. Although men, too, can be victims of domestic violence, the problem
overwhelmingly impacts women. Some feminist scholars argue persuasively that using
gender-neutral terms veils the gender-related causes and implications of domestic violence.
See Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE II, 13 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988). This Note
will therefore refer to domestic violence as a crime against women, although the current and
proposed remedies would be available to all victims.
2. Centers for Disease Control, cited in Patti Seger, Domestic Violence Tragic for
Families, Costly to Companies, WIS. ST.J., Sept. 1,2007, at 16.
3. Id.
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defense or a mitigating circumstance when women kill their abusers. 4 The
CDC estimates that the economic costs of domestic violence (including
health costs, loss of productivity, and loss of earnings) are approximately
$8.3 billion nationwide. 5 In addition, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, after
surveying twenty-three major cities nationwide, reported that domestic
violence is a leading cause of homelessness. 6
There are presently several legal remedies available to protect a woman
from abuse. For example, a woman can request a protective order or a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") from the courts, but these judicial
orders may not hinder a determined abuser from threatening, injuring, or
killing his intended victim. Moreover, civil suits against police officers for
failing to enforce protective orders have generally been unsuccessful. 7
Mandatory arrest and no-drop policies have met with criticism from both
law enforcement and feminist scholars as ineffective and as a possible
contributing factor to an escalation of domestic violence. 8
Given the inefficacy of these measures, escape and establishment of a
new identity may be the only way for some victims of domestic violence to
break free from the cycle of abuse. But this solution has its shortcomings.
As Mary Lou Leary, Executive Director of the National Center for Victims
of Crime, reported to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2006:
Women fleeing domestic violence or stalking may have to leave
their job, their community, and their circle of friends to relocate to
a safe place. To keep from being traced by a determined
perpetrator, a woman might change her name and her Social
Security number. Then she finds she no longer has any work or
credit history. With a "clean slate" Social Security number, she's
unable to get a job or even a volunteer position. She may have
trouble registering her children at school. She often can't even get
a library card. 9

4. For a classic case raising this defense, see Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 80 I,
805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
5. Centers for Disease Control, cited in October Is Domestic Violence Awareness
Month, U.S. STATES NEWS, Sept. 26, 2007 [hereinafter October Is Domestic Violence
Awareness Month].
6. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2006 Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness,
cited in October Is Domestic Violence Awareness Month, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005)
(enforcement of TRO not mandatory; no civil right to enforcement of TRO absent a
showing of some affirmative duty to act); Hanigan v. City of Kent, No. C06-176JLR, 2006
WL 3544603, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006) (police officer not liable for failing to keep
confidential victim's address following an incident of domestic violence).
8. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 1657, 1680 (2004).
9. The Cost and Impact of Crime: Understanding the Financial and Human Impact
of Criminal Activity: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo (2006)
(testimony of Mary Lou Leary, Executive Director, National Center for Victims of Crime).
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Moreover, advancing internet technologies and the release of personal
infonnation by government agencies, courts, and corporations make it
easier than ever for an abuser to find and continue to abuse his victim. 10
The problem is further compounded if the woman relocates to a new state,
where the laws protecting her confidentiality may differ from those of her
home state and where she may have to re-register with - and risk exposure
by
the new state's agencies and courts.
Domestic violence shelters, family violence clinics, and lawyers have
developed innovative ways to protect the confidential infonnation of
women fleeing domestic violence. For example, all federally funded
domestic violence shelters are legally required to meet minimum standards
of confidentiality, II and many family violence clinics keep confidential the
location of the clinic, itself, as well as the names and addresses of all its
clients to prevent abusers from finding their victims. However, when a
domestic violence shelter breaches that confidentiality, a victim may have
no legal remedy. 12 Additionally, a court may sometimes order a shelter or
clinic to reveal the victim's name and address to the other party (sometimes
the abuser) in a court proceeding, and thus frustrate the purpose of such a
confidentiality policy for a fleeing victim. 13
Many documents and forums provide public records that place a heavy
burden on efforts to maintain confidentiality, including driver's license
infonnation (including name, address, birth date, physical description, and
any traffic violations in the last seven years), vehicle registration
infonnation, voter registration infonnation, property, court cases, arrests,
and change-of-address notifications. 14 Although there are some restrictions
on who can obtain such infonnation (except in the case of property records
and most court records), a savvy internet user or a charismatic individual

The committee was investigating the financial and human impact of crime and rates of
recidivism. 152 Congo Rec. 0987 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2006) (meeting of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary).
10. See Cynthia Southworth et aI., Research Note, Intimate Partner Violence,
Technology, and Stalking, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 842 (2007).
11. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of
Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273,282 (1995); Family Violence Prevention and Services
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10413 (2000) (requiring federally funded shelters to keep the
victim's address confidential absent written authorization from the principal operator(s) of
the shelter).
12. See, e.g., Thompson v. Branches-Domestic Violence Shelter of Huntington, Inc.,
534 S.E.2d 33, 40 (W. Va. 2000) (plaintiffs' negligence claim against shelter for breach of
confidentiality barred by one-year statute of limitations).
13. See, e.g., People v. Ramsey, 665 NY.S.2d 501, 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997)
(ordering counseling service to disclose the domestic violence victim's contact information
to the District Attorney for use in a criminal trial against the abuser); Sacharow v.
Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 720 (N.J. 2003) (court not bound by determination of domestic
violence made in address confidentiality program).
14. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, From Cradle to Grave: Government Records and
Your Privacy (2004), http://www.privacyrights.orglfs/fsll-pub.htm.
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can easily obtain such information from either the government agency itself
or from corporations willing to sell such information for marketing or other
purposes. State and federal courts publish court records on the internet
where they are accessible through legal search engines and thereby provide
the tools for abusers to track their victims to at least a general community,
if not to an exact address. 15 Fear of having identifying information
published may deter domestic violence victims from filing necessary court
cases or registering restraining orders or custody orders if they relocate to a
new state. 16 Even something as simple as buying property and filing the
record in a state that publishes such records online 17 poses risks to the
woman who fears being tracked by her abuser, or may prove deadly for the
woman who underestimates the ease of internet searches and the lengths to
which her abuser would go to continue the abuse.
Statutory solutions require a careful balancing of the privacy needs of
relocated victims of domestic violence and the desirability of free access to
public records for political accountability. Many states have address
confidentiality programs ("ACP") for survivors of domestic violence, but
other states still leave the problem unaddressed. Few states address the
more complicated problem of interstate relocation or how to register a
protective order in a new state while maintaining one's confidentiality,
since many states require notice of the registration to the person against
whom the protective order is ordered the abuser.
This Note will address this conflict in legal interests. Part II will
explore current legal remedies for a woman seeking to protect her
confidentiality, including name change statutes, Public Records
exemptions, and ACPs. Part III will briefly examine the additional
obstacles a woman fleeing with her children faces, especially when the
abuser has custody rights to the children. Part IV will discuss some
proposed remedies from the legal community and also make some
recommendations for legal reform. The Note concludes that states need to
consider a more uniform application of state law combined with an
integrated approach to helping victims of domestic violence, particularly
those in poverty, relocate to start a new life free from abuse.

15. See Safety Net, National Network to End Domestic Violence, Public & Internet
Access to Court Records: Safety and Privacy Risks for Victims of Domestic Violence & All
Citizen Using the Justice System 1-2, http://projects.ischool.washington.edullawsymposiumJ
docs/CourtRecordsandVictims.pdf(\ast visited Oct. 5, 2008).
16. Jd. at 2.
17. This example is suggested by SafetyNet. [d.
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II. MOVING THROUGH THE STATUTORY REGIME
A. NAME CHANGE

One way a woman can change her identity is to change her name upon
relocation. All states allow her to do so, either by employing the common
law method or by meeting the state's statutory requirements for a name
change.
Under the common law, a person can lawfully change her name at any
time provided that it does not interfere with the rights of others and is not
done for a fraudulent purpose. 18 Consistent, non-fraudulent use of a chosen
name satisfies this common law requirement. However, for a victim of
domestic violence, the emergency situation of violence hardly allows
enough time to establish consistent, non-fraudulent use. Thus, victims of
domestic violence must either rely on statutory name changes in order to
flee their abusers or risk accusations of fraud in voter registration, medical
care, and employment. Additionally, a court-ordered name change is
necessary to obtain appropriate governmental documentation reflecting the
change and permitting the victim to begin a new life. 19
In general, name change statutes require notice of the proposed change,
an assertion that the change is made in good faith and not to perpetrate a
fraud, and that the change be consistent with public interests. 2o In addition,
both legal parents of a minor must receive notice of a minor's petition to
change his or her name. 21 The name change is then published in local
newspapers in accordance with the state's public acts and open court
records requirements. 22 Obviously this last requirement of publication
defeats the purpose of a woman trying to keep her new identity secret to
escape her abuser.
Despite increasing awareness of domestic violence as a social problem,
relatively few states include a confidentiality provision in their name
change statutes. 23 Those state statutes that do waive the publication

18. See 65 C.J.S. Names § 2J (2007).
J 9. Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics 0/ Advising a Battered
Woman Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REv. 999, IOOJ (2007).
20. See 65 C.J.S. Names § 22 (2007). Ajudge may deny a name change in the public
interest where the name change is governed by an unworthy motive or fraud, or the chosen
name is "bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous, or offensive to common decency and good
taste," particularly where the name might "provoke violence, arouse passions, or inflame
hatred." /d. See, e.g., Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 764 (Cal. Ct. App, 1992)
(Hmisteri nigger" not pennitted); In re Name Change Petition of Stanley Larue Bethea, 8 Pa.
D. & CAth 645,646 (1991) ("World Saviour" not pennitted). Denials of name change "in
the public interest" should thus have little effect on a victim of domestic violence, even
though, in seeking a name change, she is technically perpetrating a fraud on her abuser.
21. See 65 CJ.S. Names § 23 (2007).
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 63-64 (Supp. 2008).
23. See, e.g., id. § 64-a; N.M. STAT. § 40-8-2(B) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-2802(3) (1996 & Supp. 2007).
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requirement and seal the name change record to maintain confidentiality
usually require a showing of jeopardy in addition to the aforementioned
requirements for a name change - a showing that can be difficult for some
victims to make. For example, under North Carolina's statute, a woman
must have some documentation of domestic violence in the form of police
reports, court records, or letters from a shelter or other domestic violence
program. 24 Other statutes are silent as to what burden of proof the victim
must meet to satisfy the showing of jeopardy, although two New York
cases have indicated that the victim must show a history of abuse by the
abuser and a fear of continued abuse through personal knowledge, hearsay
evidence of abuse, and any protective orders or criminal records based on
such abuse. 25 Both cases weighed the information generously in favor of
the victim despite a lack of tangible evidence (documents, photographs,
witness testimony, etc.) of abuse. Additionally, there is a trend in states
with ACPS 26 to amend their name change statutes to provide for
confidential name changes for program participants. 27 Many states use
language similar to New York's name change statute, indicating that the
evidentiary showing of jeopardy is similarly minimal. However, in North
Carolina, unless the petitioner is a participant in the ACP, she bears the
rather onerous burden of showing a history of domestic violence by
producing police, court, or agency records documenting the abuse, or
presenting documentation of the receipt of funds from the Domestic
Violence Center Fund. 28 Such a burden may deter victims who lack
official documentation from taking advantage of the amendment to the
name change statute, even though the additional evidentiary requirement is
ostensibly to prevent fraud. 29
Women fleeing out-of-state may face additional hurdles in attempting
to change their names. Some states, especially those without a confidential
name change statute, have a residency or domicile requirement,30 which
prevents a new arrival from immediately changing her name upon
24. Leah Friedman, New Laws Protect Victims - And Bears, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC), Oct. 1,2007, at Al (discussing the new North Carolina law).
25. See In re Doe, 773 N.Y.S.2d 215,216 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (hearsay evidence
that abuser was wanted in Georgia on criminal charges permitted); see also In re L.V., 768
N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (letter from District Attorney substantiating
petitioner's account of abuse considered sufficient).
26. See infra Section II(C).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1277(b)(l) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
101-2(b)(I) (2008).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-2(b)(2).
29. Victims of domestic violence are equally subject to such scrutiny as any other
person seeking a name change, especially following United States v. Aspinall, which
involved a woman who changed her name on the ground of domestic violence while
actually seeking to commit credit card fraud and employment fraud. 389 F.3d 332 (2d. Cir.
2004). Cases like Aspinall discourage legislatures from relaxing the traditional name
change requirements, even for victims of domestic violence.
30. 65 C.J.S. Names § 22 (2007).
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relocation to her new home. Thus, such residency requirements, like the
common law name change method, could prove detrimental to the woman
fleeing the immediate and emergency impacts of domestic violence.
Little case law exists on name changes for victims of domestic
violence, even in states with confidentiality provisions in their name
change statutes. One explanation for the absence of case law is that women
fleeing their abusers simply do not have the time or resources to bring the
matters to the attention of courts. Another reason is that demanding a court
order paradoxically risks revealing the name or whereabouts of the victim
to an internet-savvy abuser. A third, more optimistic explanation is that
informal "underground" relocation assistance available in every state and
the formal ACPs enacted in some states may be reducing the need to rely
on court orders. Finally, courts may simply be sealing all records of name
changes related to domestic violence in an effort to protect the victim's
identity from the abuser.
Whatever the reason, three court cases in the last three years address
such confidential name changes. In In re L. v., a New York trial court first
addressed an issue arising under New York Civil Rights Law sections 63
and 64-a, the state's statutory name change and confidential name change
statutes. 31 Section 64-a permits the party seeking to change his or her
name to forgo the publication requirement under the name change statute if
the court finds that publication "would jeopardize [the] applicant's personal
safety," and permits the record of the name change "to be sealed, to be
opened only by order of the court for good cause shown or at the request of
the applicant.,,32 The applicant in this case demonstrated a history of
domestic violence by the father of her minor child (on whose behalf she
also sought a name change) by offering evidence of several criminal court
orders of protection in multiple counties. 33 In light of this showing, the
court agreed that the applicant was a candidate for non-publication under
section 64-a and granted her the exemption. 34 In the course of its opinion,
the court noted that despite the ten-year existence of the section 64-a
exemption, no case had yet specified what circumstances justified such an
exemption. 35
In the same year, a subsequent New York case, In re Doe, clarified the
showing necessary for an exemption under section 64_a. 36 There, an
applicant requested exemption from publication, as well as a sealing of the
court record of the name change, for both herself and her minor daughter. 37

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

In re L.V., 768 N.Y.S.2d 304,305 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003).
Id. at 305 (citing N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 64-a).
Id.
!d.
Id.
In re Doe, 773 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003).
Id.
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The applicant asserted having personal knowledge of child abuse, offered
hearsay evidence of the father's criminal record based on his abuse of the
applicant, and presented an order of protection issued on behalf of the
applicant earlier that year. 38 Although the court had no problem finding
such a showing sufficient to grant the mother's exemption, it had to deal
more carefully with the daughter, noting that normally the father has an
interest in his child's name change and that any name change must be
shown to be in the child's best interests, including the interest in
maintaining a relationship with the father. 39 The statute provided an
exemption for notice to the other parent for a child's name change only if
the second parent was deceased or could not be located. 40 In this case, the
father was both alive and locatable 41 (which was arguably a part of the
problem). However, the court found that the father's "gross misconduct
and the most flagrant violations of his duties as a ... father" constituted
constructive abandonment, and therefore, the father no longer retained his
right to notice of the name change as a parent of the child. 42 The court thus
held that in the case of a child's name change, where there is a showing of
physical danger to the parent or child, and that the other parent "effectively
has abandoned his rights concerning his child," the court may dispense
with notice of the name change,43 thus reconciling the child's name change
statute with the confidential name change exemption under section 64_a. 44
More recently, a New Jersey appellate court reversed a trial court for
refusing to relax publication requirements for a name change and refusing
to seal the record of the name change, even after the applicant attached a
lengthy certification to her application detailing the history of domestic
violence and included police reports, medical reports, protective orders,
restraining orders, and photographs of her injuries. 45 In In re E.F.G., the
trial court relied on an older New Jersey case, Basile v. Basile,46 which
held that a court could not enter a name change for a child while a domestic
violence proceeding was pending. 47 The Appellate Division, applying a
balancing test that weighed factors against relaxing the publication
standards with the injustice that would result from relaxation, found that
the applicant clearly demonstrated "a well-founded concern for her
personal safety" and that there was no evidence of fraud or other unlawful
38. Doe, 773 N.y.s.2d at 216.
39. /d. at217.
40. Id. at217-18.
41. /d. at 218.
42. Id. at 219 (quoting Application o/Fein, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. Civ. ct. 1966».
The court did not, however, elaborate on what actions by the father constituted such gross
misconduct, other than to allude to the evidence of domestic violence.
43. Id. at 220.
44. See id. ("Only this interpretation gives meaning to both statutes.").
45. In re E.F.G., 942 A.2d 166, 168 (N.J. Super ct. App. Div. 2008).
46. 604 A.2d 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).
47. E.F.G.,942 A.2d at 169.
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reason weighing against relaxation. 48 Thus, relaxing the publication
requirements was appropriate under the circumstances of abuse. 49 The
court applied a similar balancing test to determine whether to seal the
record. Under that test, the plaintiff bore the burden of overcoming "the
'strong presumption of [public] access '" by demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that secrecy outweighs that presumption. 50
The court found that the applicant clearly overcame the presumption, where
"[s]he has not made a broad unsubstantiated allegation of potential harm,
but rather has submitted to the court a tragic and upsetting history,
documenting domestic violence which warrants protection.,,51 Thus, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to seal the
record of the applicant's name change. 52
Fortunately, all three of these cases reached the right outcome, but the
dilemma the court faced in Doe - whether to notify the child's father of
the name change in light of allegations of abuse - demonstrates the
challenge in obtaining a name change for a minor. Similarly, L. V
demonstrates the general difficulty in obtaining such a name change,
complete with an evidentiary burden of showing jeopardy, in the middle of
a flight from the abuser. E.P. G. exposes the dangers of the balancing test,
under which two different, competent courts could reach entirely opposite
results despite extensive documentation of abuse, while the woman
continued to risk exposure to resolve the matter and move on with her life.
Simply put, the name change method is an imperfect solution. Even
when she changes her name, the woman may feel compelled to disclose her
previous identity. For example, she may want to permit background checks
for employment, giving her abuser an opportunity to find her by comparing
past and present background checks. 53 As noted in L. V, the court record of
the name change can be unsealed at the request of the applicant,54 as may
be necessary for employment or other court cases. A name change will
make it more difficult for the woman to receive spousal support, since she
will either have to disclose her name or location to receive the check or, in
an enforcement effort, litigate and risk disclosure. Because a name change
(and corresponding new social security number) only changes part of her
identity, the woman may still be located through her address, through
family and friends with whom the woman is still in contact, and through
third parties who maintain (and lack confidentiality policies on) records for
the newly named woman. Lastly, if a woman moves to another state, it is
48. E.F. G., 942 A.2d at 170-71.
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id. at 172 (quoting Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 559
(N.J. 1995)).
51. Id.atl72.
52. Id.
53. Goodmark, supra note 19, at I 002.
54. In re L.V., 768 N.y'S.2d 304, 304 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003).
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not clear how she will register for voting, a driver's license, or even apply
for medical care or employment, absent some record of her name change.
The inadequacy of name changes ~nd the difficulty in procuring one
has led some states to provide other statutory remedies for women who "go
underground" 55 to flee their abusers. These statutory remedies do not
replace name changes but instead add layers of protection for the identity
of a woman fleeing abuse.
B.

EXEMPTIONS FROM PUBLIC RECORDS ACTS

Another early statutory method of protecting women's identity changes
when they fled abusive relationships was to simply exempt such women
from the state's Public Records Act. Public Records Acts, like the federal
Freedom of Information Act,56 are considered "essential for a functioning
democracy" because they keep the government accountable to the people
and permit individuals "to understand and evaluate the inner workings" of
the government. 57 As one scholar puts it, "The greatest threat to privacy
comes from government in secret.,,58 Thus, there is a strong public interest
in favor of keeping public records of government actions, especially acts by
politicians, agencies, and courts. These public records do include personal
information such as that kept in court records, so disclosure is generally
limited to discrete, statutorily designated circumstances.
In response to domestic violence victims' fears that the Public Records
Acts were exposing their names and addresses to abusers, some
legislatures, like Washington, explicitly exempted the addresses of victims
of domestic violence from operation of the Acts if the victim could show a
fear for her safety. 59 However, these exemptions proved unworkable. An
individual would have to ask for an exemption from each agency having a
record of her address, and each agency would be responsible for redacting
the address from the record before releasing the record to the requesting
party.6O Thus, the multiplicity of state agencies and their differing policies
on public disclosure limited the potential for Public Records Act
exemptions. Private businesses also felt that the exemptions were overly
cumbersome, arguing in part that their records would be less effective if
addresses were not included. 61 The victim also benefited only marginally

55. See Kathleen J. Ferraro & John M. Johnson, The New Underground Railroad, 6
377, 380-83 (1985) (describing the "underground
railroad" for victims of domestic violence).
56. 5 U.s.C. § 552 (2006).
57. Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the
Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 63, 68 (2006).
58. /d. at 112.
59. See Jeffrey T. Even, Washington's Address Confidentiality Program: Relocation
Assistance for Victims ofDomestic Violence, 31 GoNZ. L. REv. 523, 526 (1995).
60. /d. at 527.
61. /d. at 527 n.24.
STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
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from these exceptions.
Even if the woman diligently pursued
confidentiality, a mere exemption from the Public Records Act could not
help her register to vote with confidentiality unless the state provided an
independent exemption for voter registration. An example is provided by
D. C. v. Superintendent of Elections, 62 a New Jersey case arising before the
state adopted its current ACP. There, the victim attempted to register to
vote in a new county after relocating to escape her abusive ex-husband and
offered to disclose her actual address to the commissioner of voter
registration to refute concerns of fraud if the commissioner agreed to keep
that address confidential. 63 However, the commissioner refused, noting
that the voter registration laws, independent of the Public Records Act,
require the county clerk to make available the names and addresses of
voters to the pUblic. 64 The victim then beseeched the court to read the
state's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 - which provided
some level of confidentiality in court records for a victim of domestic
violence 65 - broadly enough to extend to voter registration. 66 The court
discussed the policy behind allowing a victim of domestic violence to
register to vote using a post office box address and agreed with the victim,
finding that allowing an exemption for victims of domestic violence did not
compromise the integrity of the system, since the victim's real address
would still be disclosed to the commissioner to prevent voter fraud. 67
This victim's travails underscore the inefficiency of Public Records
Act exemptions, which provide an incredibly burdensome process for a
victim simply to exercise her right to vote. Moreover, the time the victim
spends trying to keep her address confidential and the diligence necessary
to make sure each agency and court is aware of the need for confidentiality
make it more challenging and more dangerous to escape an abuser by going
underground.
Despite these problems, Public Records Acts exemptions remain an
important part of protecting the identity of domestic violence victims,
though, through ACPs, the process for record keeping has become easier to
manage.
C.

ADDRESS CONFIDENTIALITY PROGRAMS

In 1991, in response to the problems administering the exemptions
from the Public Records Acts and the limited nature of the protection that
they offered, Washington pioneered the ACP 68 to help victims of domestic
62. 618 A.2d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
63. Id. at 932.
64. Id. at 933.
65. /d. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25:18-25 (West 2000) (keeping the address of
the victim confidential from the defendant-abuser)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 934.
68. Even, supra note 59, at 524.
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violence, stalking, or sexual assault keep their addresses confidential
without the need to rely on the confidentiality policies of third parties or
risk losing their ability to stay connected with the world altogether.
Washington's ACP provides a paradigm for providing a substitute address
to victims of domestic violence, and it will be used here as a framework for
discussing ACPs in different states.
I. How the Program Works
In all states with ACPs, the program generally operates as follows. A
victim of domestic violence files an application for a "substitute" address
with the appropriate governmental agency (the Office of the Secretary of
State under Washington law).69 After the applicant is accepted and
certified into the program,70 the state agent provides a substitute address for
the applicant, which she may use for personal purposes,71 such as
employment, health care, or electric bills. The victim's mail is forwarded
from that substitute address to her actual address, with the actual address
being known only to (and kept confidential by) the Secretary of State. 72
The participant is also given an "authorization card," which includes her
name, an authorization code, her substitute mailing address, the expiration
date of her enrollment in the program, and her signature. 73
A state agency must accept the address listed on the ACP authorization
card for an ACP participant dealing with that agency. 74 Federal agencies,
however, are not bound by the state law and only accept authorization cards
for official purposes on a voluntary basis. 75 This shortcoming implicates
the need for federalization of such programs or the promulgation of a
Uniform Act adopted by the federal government. Private actors are also
not required to accept the address on the authorization card, but there is
hardly any reason not to given the small inconvenience and the important
policy interest served. However, greater awareness of these programs
could help encourage private cooperation with ACPs.
The ACP also provides an exemption to program participants for
purposes of voter registration. A participant must disclose her actual
address to register to vote (in order to determine district designations and
other jurisdictional matters) but is enrolled as a protected voter. 76 As a
protected voter, her substitute address is listed as a matter of public record

69. Even, supra note 59, at 531 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 40.24.030(1) (1998». In
Florida, the Office of the Attorney General serves as the agent. See FLA. STAT. § 741 .403( 1)
(1998).
70. For the discussion on application and acceptance, see infra section 1I(C)(2).
71. Even, supra note 59, at 531.
72. Id. at 535.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 535·36.
76. Id., at 537.
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and voting records, while the actual address is kept confidential. 77 A
protected voter then votes the same way as a voter who is in the service by absentee ballot. 78
Lastly, ACP participants are generally exempted from the state's Public
Records Acts by statute, thus incorporating the earlier attempts to help
victims with more streamlined and efficient methods of protecting their
confidentiality .
2. Application and Approval
Virtually anyone can apply to a state's ACP, but approval of the
application is subject to the requirements listed by state statute. At
minimum in all states, an application must include a signed, sworn
statement that the applicant is a victim of domestic violence and fears for
her safety, a statement designating the Secretary of State as the agent for
receiving and distributing mail to the confidential address, the actual
mailing address and phone numbers of the applicant, and all new addresses
(residential, school, work, etc.) that the applicant wishes to be kept
confidential. 79 In Washington,80 Florida, 81 Massachusetts, 82 New Hampshire,83 and Vermont, 84 certification of these applications does not require
actual proof of domestic violence nor does it require that the victim's fear
be reasonable. The Secretary of State need not make any credibility
determination so long as the application is complete. In fact, once
completed, the ACP statutes mandate acceptance, using the phrase "shall
approve" for any properly filed and completed application. 85 Once
accepted, the applicant is certified for participation in the program for four
years, subject to extension by renewal. 86
Some states have additional application requirements, restricting the
number and types of victims who can successfully enter the program. For
example, Indiana 87 and Rhode Island 88 have adopted ACPs that limit
applicants to those persons who have an actual protective order against
their abusers. Indiana defines "domestic violence" broadly to include any
act of violence whether or not it has been reported to a law enforcement

77. Even, supra note 59, at 538.
78. !d.
79. [d. at 532-33 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 40.24.030(l)(a) (1991 & Supp. 1996».
80. !d. at 532.
FLA. STAT. § 741.403 (1998).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 9A § 2 (2001).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7.42 (2008).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1151 (2000).
85. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.403(1); WASH.
Supp. 1996); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 9A § 2(2).

81.
82.
83.
84.

86. Even, supra note 59, at 533.
87. IND. CODE §§ 5-26.5-2-2 (2002).
88. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-28-2 (2003).

REv.

CODE § 40.24.030(1) (1991 &
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agency. 89 However, when applying to Indiana's ACP, the applicant must
include a copy of a valid protective order issued on behalf of the applicant
or the minor applicant in addition to other, more standard requirements
(sworn statement, designation, addresses, signature) to receive approval
and entry into the program. 90 Rhode Island similarly limits participation by
adopting a very narrow definition of the term "victim of domestic
violence," including only individuals with restraining orders or no-contact
orders. 91 However, such orders may be issued either by Rhode Island or by
a court in any other state. 92 The Rhode Island ACP does not specify
whether the restraining order must be valid or if it can be an expired order.
By requiring an actual protective order, valid or otherwise, as a
prerequisite for entry into the ACP, both Rhode Island and Indiana limit the
scope of their programs to reported and documented acts of domestic
violence. Since the CDC estimates that only twenty-five percent of
incidents of domestic violence are reported at all,93 let alone followed
through on, such a requirement may severely curtail the usefulness of the
ACPs to victims of domestic violence fleeing their abusers in these states.
Other states have adopted a middle ground, requesting some evidence
of domestic violence 94 or requiring only that domestic violence have been
reported, regardless of whether the victim followed through with pressing
charges or obtaining a restraining order. 95 For example, California's ACP
requires some evidence of domestic violence in the application to the ACP,
although there is no requirement that the Secretary of State make credibility
determinations on the evidence presented. 96 California's statute also
requires that the applicant receive assistance in the application process
from a "community-based victim's assistance program," to provide
counseling and an orientation to the program. 97 To enforce this, California
requires that the person who assisted the applicant also sign the application.
One can see this latter requirement as an additional check on verifYing that
the applicant is an actual victim of domestic violence, since, presumably,
assistants in a community-based victim's assistance program could make
their own credibility determinations as to whether or not to help any given
victim apply. It also presents another obstacle for a victim of domestic
violence, who may not know where to find such victim's assistance
89. IND. CODE § 5-26.5-1-3 (2002).
90. IND. CODE § 5-26.5-2-2(2) (2002).
91. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-28-2(c)(2003).
92. !d.
93. October Is Domestic Violence Awareness Month, supra note 5.
94. See, e.g., CAL. GoY'TCODE § 6206(a)(2-3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-3 (West 2008) (defining "domestic violence" as
"an act ... [that] has been reported to a law enforcement agency or court."). See also
Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 717 (N.J. 2003) ("The Candidate is not required to
provide a final restraining order to be eligible.").
96. See CAL. GOy'TCODE § 6206(a)(2&3).
97. !d. § 6206(a).
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programs in her community. In another variation on the middle ground,
New Jersey simply limits its definition of "domestic violence" to acts that
have been reported to a law enforcement agency or court. 98 However, the
statute does not require that these reports result in a final restraining order
or criminal prosecution. 99
Each state's ACP statute reflects a particular policy decision and
varying concerns of the state legislature. Statutes like Washington's,
permitting a broad range of applicants to enter the program regardless of
actual proof of domestic violence, reflect a legislative concern for victims
of domestic violence, a desire to facilitate their efforts to start a new life
free from abuse, and a corresponding, though perhaps misplaced, I 00 trust
that only victims will use the program. By contrast, statutes like Indiana's
reflect a greater concern with non-victims' abuse of the system, as reflected
by the more stringent requirements for approval. Legislatures in California
and New Jersey also demonstrate some fear of abuse in their evidentiary
requirements, although these states do not go as far as Indiana and Rhode
Island by requiring actual protective orders. While fraudulent use of the
program and its resources certainly presents a legitimate concern,
heightened requirements for application could make the ACP less
appealing to victims of domestic violence who have either no evidence of
violence or did not report or seek a protective order when the abuse
occurred. Additionally, the differences in state statutes may make it more
difficult for a woman relocating interstate to take advantage of the
programs, since she may be unfamiliar with the ACP in another
jurisdiction, or her state of choice may have no ACP at all. 101
3. Exceptions
The ACPs generally include exceptions under which the state agent
must disclose the confidential address of the participant. Statutes make
general exceptions for requests for an address by a law enforcement
agency, court-mandated disclosure, and cancellation of certification, which
leaves the address open to disclosure under the state's Public Records

98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-3.
99. Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 717 (N.J. 2003).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2004),
discussed at greater length, supra note 29.
101. As this Note goes to press, thirty-one states have an ACP (Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illionis, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia). The National Conference of
State Legislatures has a list updated through 2006 of states with ACPs. See Nat'l Conf. of
State Leg., States with Address Confidentiality Programs for Domestic Violence Survivors,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/dvsurvive.htm (last visited Sept. 7,2008) (listing nineteen
states).
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Act. 102 These exceptions reflect the existence of a competing state interest
that necessarily trumps the individual's interest in confidentiality.
Because some victims of domestic violence are often still involved in
dissolution or custody litigation, the court-mandated disclosure exception
could severely limit the possibility of participating in the ACP. However,
if the litigation occurs in another state (because the victim has relocated to
a new state), the enforcement of the foreign decree may be disputed under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, giving the participant an opportunity to
defend against disclosure. 103 The statute thus relies on the justice system to
protect the ACP from abuse by requiring the litigant to give convincing
reasons for disclosure.
Some states, however, have not explicitly codified the circumstances
under which the Secretary of State may disclose addresses of participants
absent cancellation or termination of certification. In these states, courts
may be free to disregard the ACP entirely, because being neither an
"agency" within the definition of the statute nor precluded from reopening
the issue of whether there was actual domestic violence, they may order
disclosure of the participant's address absent a showing of a reasonable
apprehension of fear of future violence or a past incident of domestic
violence.104 In Sacharow v. Sacharow, for example, a program participant
in New Jersey's ACP sought to prevent disclosure of her residential address
to the father of her minor child. 105 The court held, however, that the ACP
participant had the initial burden of proving prior domestic abuse by the
other party as well as a "realistic fear" that abuse will recur. 106 Absent
such a showing, the court could disclose her address to the other party.
Sacharow's refusal to protect the victim's confidentiality absent a
"realistic fear" of recurring abuse likely applies even in states where the
statute does limit the exceptions. The court in Sacharow did not rely on the
existence of an exception to permit possible disclosure, since the ACP did
not require actual litigation of domestic violence or a reasonable threat of
continued violence. 107 Instead, the court based its decision on the
definition of "agencies," which are bound by the ACP, and on collateral
estoppel. Those statutes that make exceptions for court orders appear not to
bind the courts at all and, thus, expose the victim's address to the
possibility of disclosure should she be required to go to court. However,
Sacharow's collateral estoppel argument is significantly weaker in states
102. Even, supra note 59, at 540. The last exception will be discussed at greater
length infra section II(C)(4).
103. ld. at 544-45.
104. Sacharowv. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 718-19 (N.J. 2003).
105. ld. at 715.
106. ld. at 722. Note, however, that Sacharow took place in the context of a child
custody order. Thus, the court's holding on the burden of proof may be limited to child
custody cases where the child's best interest is also at issue.
107.ld.at718-19.
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like Indiana and Rhode Island, which require an actual court-issued
protective order before admission into the program. Although these orders
are often obtained ex parte and therefore are not issue preclusive,
participants in these programs will likely already have all the evidence they
need to convince a court not to disclose their address.
Court-ordered disclosures are the biggest loophole in the ACP, but
even such disclosures remain subject to the rules of the court and judicial
review, giving a victim of domestic violence substantial opportunity to
make a showing of previous domestic violence and fear of future abuse.
The court-ordered disclosure can still be problematic, though, for a victim
of domestic violence who lacks the means to make that evidentiary
showing.
4. Termination and Cancellation
Participation can be terminated for any of the following reasons: The
participant relocated without informing the Secretary of State of the change
of address; forwarded mail is returned to the Secretary of State as
undeliverable; the participant provided false information on the application
or used the ACP to commit fraud or other crimes; the participant changed
her name to further protect her abuser from discovering her identity (in
states without an integrated confidential name change statute); or the
participant failed to renew her application four years after certification. 108
Of these, only the termination for changing one's name appears
problematic to the victim seeking to relocate. Of course, the statute does
not prevent a person seeking to change her name from reapplying to the
program after the name change, and the Secretary of State has an important
interest in having the correct identification of the victim in the records. 109
Nonetheless, reapplication after a name change adds an extra procedural
hurdle to acquiring a new identity while running from an abuser. This is
one place where a sympathetic legislature can easily take action: by
revising the statute to explicitly provide for situations in which the
participant seeks to change her name, as through a notification procedure
similar to the change-of-address procedure provided by the program. 110
Program termination can also occur if the state's ACP statute is
repealed. For example, California's ACP includes a sunset provision,
requiring renewal of the statute by the year 2013. 111 So far, California
has continued to meet its deadlines for renewal (the last renewal

108. Even, supra note 59, at 533.
109. [d. at 534.
110. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:4-5(2) (West 2008) (participant must give seven
days advance notice of change in residential address).
III. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6211 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
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occurred in 2008),112 so it is not clear what effect, if any, this sunset
provision will have on participants in the program.
5. Criticisms
Although ACPs are a significant statutory improvement to aid women
fleeing abuse, they still suffer from shortcomings that leave some women
unable to rely on the program's protections. These shortcomings include
the lack of uniformity between state laws, the exceptions for disclosure,
particularly court-mandated disclosure, and the ACP's effects on third
parties, like employers and federal agencies.
ACPs do not include residency requirements, which means that a
woman relocating from out-of-state may take advantage of the program
upon arrival. However, in states requiring some showing of a report of
domestic violence or a current restraining order, interstate relocation may
prove more difficult. Rhode Island's statute, for example, addresses such
problems of interstate relocation by expressly permitting a victim to use an
out-of-state restraining or no-contact order to establish her status as a
victim of domestic violence.113 By contrast, Indiana's requirement that the
applicant have a "valid" restraining order may require the victim to reregister her restraining order in the new state, an action that could provide
her abuser with knowledge of her whereabouts and thereby discourage her
from doing so. Here, federal law provides some assistance with interstate
relocation. The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") requires states
to give "Full Faith and Credit" to foreign protective orders. 114 However,
some states have not implemented the legislation necessary to do SO.115
Moreover, if courts are not obligated or even encouraged to keep the
victim's name and address confidential before she registers her out-of-state
protective order, it is not at all clear what purpose the ACP serves if she
must expose her location to access the program in the first place.
112. See II B.E. WITKIN, WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wife
§ 371 (2005 & Supp. 2008).
113. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-28-2(c)(2003).
114. Pub. L. No. 103-322. Enacted in 1994, VAWA:
strengthened evidentiary protections for sexual assault victims, increased
sentences for repeat offenders who commit crimes against women, created a
national hotline, [] developed several grant programs to provide states with
more resources to fight domestic violence, ... created a civil remedy for
gender-motivated violence,... created new federal domestic violence
crimes, ... [and required] all jurisdictions to grant full faith and credit to the
protection orders of other jurisdictions ....
Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit
Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Eriforcement of Protection Orders, 98
Nw. U. L. REv. 827,837-38 (2004).
liS. Carolyne R. Dilgard, Note, Crossing the Line: The Interstate Implications of
Issuing and Enforcing Domestic Violence Protection Orders: An Examination of New
Jersey, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 253, 257-58 (2003); Sack, supra note 114, at 829-30. See also 18
U.S.c. § 2265 (2000) (VAWA's full faith and credit provision).
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Some cases have addressed the efficacy of ACPs, generally in the
context of disclosure. As discussed above, the court in Sacharow ordered
the mother, who was a participant in New Jersey's ACP, to disclose her
residential address to the father after the court ordered joint custody of
their minor child, unless she could show that there was a previous act of
domestic violence and that she had a "realistic fear" of future abuse. 116 If
she fails to do so, the court may feel free to disclose her address to the
other party. However, if she meets this burden, then disclosure is
presumptively against the child's best interests, and the burden shifts to
the other party to show that disclosure is in the child's best interests. l17
The court found that enrollment in the ACP did not bind the court to a
It reached this
determination that confidentiality is necessary. 118
conclusion after noting that enrollment in an ACP does not require an
evidentiary hearing or substantial showing of domestic violence but only
a sworn statement and some evidence that domestic violence occurred
and that the mother fears (reasonably or otherwise) future violence. I 19
Thus, according to the court, the ACP certification has no binding
precedential value, signifying that the court must embark on its own
balancing of the need for confidentiality and the best interests of the
child. 120 As discussed earlier, Sacharow may be limited to the child
custody context. Different state statutes may reach different conclusions
based on the effect their ACPs have on the court, depending on whether
the ACP permits the court to order disclosure, requires a greater showing
of previous domestic violence in the initial application to the ACP to
preclude the issue later in court, or neglects to address the issue at all.
In another case, a New York court discussed how the state's
confidentiality policies impact the confidentiality policies (or lack
thereof) of private parties. In Reynolds v. Fraser, a woman contested her
termination for not being at home while on sick leave. 121 The employer
had refused to sign a confidentiality agreement and was therefore not
permitted to know his employee's whereabouts while she was on sick
leave (she was at a domestic violence shelter that refused to disclose her
location).122 The New York court found that the interest in protecting the
woman's confidential location outweighed the employer's interest in
making sure employees were actually sick on sick leave. 123 The woman,
as a victim of domestic violence, could not be terminated based on that
status.
116. Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 722 (N.J. 2003).
117. Id.at 722.
118. Id. at 718-19.
119.Id.
120. Id. at 722.
121. 781 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 891.
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Because enrollment in an ACP also implicates a woman's status as a
victim of domestic violence, it is likely that courts will hold employers
liable for actions that affect a victim peculiarly on that status. Thus, for
example, an employer may not refuse to hire a victim solely because she
refuses to give the employer her actual address, absent a confidentiality
agreement with the employer. Though this is a promising development, it
would obviously be far more direct for state legislatures simply to require
confidentiality policies of employers, which would allow victims to request
that the employer maintain as confidential the victim's name, address, and
other identification information. Increasing third-party knowledge of ACPs
and the dangers of domestic violence may also encourage employers and
other third parties to keep the woman's identity confidential.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, federal agencies are not required to
accept a state's ACP provisions. For women who depend on federal
support, like social security or welfare, to survive, participating in an ACP
is a remote possibility. Federal legislation or a Uniform Law could go a
long way to remedy this problem.
ACPs are comprehensive programs designed to aid victims of domestic
violence who seek confidentiality in fleeing their abusers. However, as
noted above, ACPs have limited applicability for victims in those states
that have a high evidentiary requirement to show domestic violence before
admission into the program. The efficacy of ACPs may be further limited
by the court's ability to order disclosure and the application of the law only
to state agencies and not private parties or federal agencies. ACPs are a
helpful legislative tool for women fleeing abuse, but they are still
imperfectly implemented in the states that have them.

III. MOVING WITH CHILDREN
A.

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WOMEN WITH CHILDREN FACE

Sometimes, a woman fleeing her abuser will have children who either
themselves face abuse or who are in danger of becoming victims of
domestic violence once their mother leaves her abuser. Most state statutes
currently do not address how to handle child custody, visitation, or support
orders in these situations, and no state provides for a timely and efficient
method of escape. A woman who flees with her children may face charges
of kidnapping, custodial interference, or contempt for violating custody
orders. 124 She may also risk disclosure of her confidential name and
location if the other parent should allege child abuse, if her abuser seeks
modification of child custody or visitation, or in an initial determination of

124. See Catherine F. Klein et aI., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and
Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with Their Children, 39

FAM. L.Q. 109, 111 n.6 (2005).
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what is in the best interests of the child if a court has not adjudicated
dissolution or child custody. 125 Merely enrolling the child in school,
getting the child medical care, or applying for state or federal benefits can
risk disclosure of the child's, and the victim's, address. 126
The state's interest in keeping children in contact with both parents is
arguably weakened when one parent is an abuser. Nonetheless, courts are
reluctant to entirely eliminate visitation even when there is a showing of
domestic violence, instead choosing to place restrictions on visitation (for
example, supervised visitation).127 A confidential move would effectively
terminate the parental rights of the non-custodial parent altogether. Parents
who wish to relocate face modification proceedings if the non-custodial
parent objects. Some modification proceedings require the relocating
parent to show whether the move is in the best interests of the child before
granting that parent custody or modifying the parenting plan. 128 Others
require an initial showing that there is a substantial change in
circumstances (the relocation itself does not necessarily meet this
requirement) before embarking on a best interests analysis. 129 In any case,
court analyses of the child's best interests often focus on the location of the
proposed move,130 and as such, a mother who wishes to flee her abuser
must disclose that location 13] or risk losing primary custody. How, then,
can the state's interest in maintaining family unity be reconciled with the
state's interest in protecting victims of abuse and helping them to start new
125. See Lauren E. Parsonage, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Harmonizing
Victim Confidentiality Rights with Children's Best Interests, 70 Mo. L. REv. 863, 867-68 (2005).
126. See Goodmark, supra note 19, at 1005.
127. See. e.g., Morash v. Minucci, 749 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
("[D]enial of that right [to meaningful visitation] is so drastic that it must be based on
substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the welfare of the child"). But
see Grossman v. Grossman, 772 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (evidence of
sexual abuse satisfies this requirement). This reluctance to deny visitation even to an
abusive parent is based on the Constitutional protection of the parent-child relationship.
128. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH ApPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW
828 (2006).
129. See, e.g., In re Marriage of LaMusga, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356,360-61 (Cal. 2004)
(a showing that relocation would be detrimental to the child's relationship with the
noncustodial parent satisfies this first prong).
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Daniels, No. E036723, 2005 WL 2033283, at * 1
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2005) (considering whether move from California to Minnesota
would harm the child's health, where the child had allergies and asthma).
131. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 6J.13001(3)(d) (Supp. 2008). Note that Florida Statute
section 61.13001 (4) does not mandate disclosure if the custodial parent has an exemption to
the state's Public Records Act, which would apply to a person enrolled in the state's ACP.
This is an imperfect solution, however, since the ACP would exempt the custodial parent's
current address but not necessarily the location of the proposed relocation. Additionally,
after the parent relocates, she will have to notity the Secretary of State seven days before the
proposed relocation or face termination from the program, which will leave her current
address exposed. See Patricia A. McKenzie, Note, Nowhere to Run: Custody. Relocation,
and Domestic Violence in Florida, 31 NOVA L. REv. 355, 369 (2007) (addressing this
problem in Florida).
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lives? Or does one interest simply trump the other? State statutes do not
yet provide a satisfying resolution of this conflict of policy interests.
When the father of the victim's child retains visitation rights, how does
his interest in knowing where his child is (and thus, the mother's address)
balance against the mother's interest in maintaining confidentiality?
Sacharow addressed this issue to some extent in the context of that state's
ACp. 132 As the court noted, New Jersey's ACP does not bind the courts to
a determination that the participant actually suffered domestic abuse. 133
The ACP, moreover, does not determine whether disclosure or maintaining
confidentiality is in the best interests of the child. 134 The court resolved the
conflict by shifting the allocation of the burden of proof. 135 The mother
has the initial burden of proof to show previous domestic violence by the
other party and a "realistic fear" of continued abuse should he know her
address. 136 Once she meets this burden, confidentiality is presumptively in
the child's best interests, and the burden shifts to the other party to show
otherwise. 137 While this seems a fair resolution of the problem of
confidentiality in child custody contexts, it is clear that requiring the courts
to fashion some legal standard for weighing the child's best interests in
these situations leaves much to the discretion of the court and the facts of
any particular case. A possible statutory resolution might use the ACP to
create some automatic presumption that disclosure of the mother's address
is not in the child's best interests, requiring the father then to prove
otherwise. However, the fact that ACPs are not currently structured to give
rise to legal presumptions appears to reflect the concern that vindictive
mothers may simply use ACPs to keep the father from ever seeing his
child, whether or not she has been abused or fears future abuse.
B.

CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE

Relocating across state lines with children implicates many civil and
criminal laws, particularly custodial interference statutes, which provide
criminal penalties for parents who interfere with custody orders by
essentially "kidnapping" their own children. Catherine F. Klein, Leslye E.
Orloff, and Hema Sarangapani discuss at great length the civil and criminal
implications for women with children fleeing from abuse across state
lines. 138 Because this Note focuses on confidential relocation, it will only
briefly summarize these issues here.

132. Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2003). See also supra notes 116-20
and accompanying text.
133. Sachrow, 826 A.2d at 718-19.
134. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-4 (West 2008).
135. Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 722.
136. [d.
137. ld.
138. See Klein, supra note 124.
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Non-custodial mothers who flee with their children may face special
problems, such as accusations of criminal custodial interference. In some
states, application of custodial interference statutes requires an existing
child custody order. Thus, children not subject to such an order may be
removed without penalty, unless the other parent challenges the victim's
right to custody. 139 Other states apply their custodial interference statutes
regardless of whether there is an existing custody order. In these states, "an
individual fleeing domestic violence may be subject to criminal conviction"
unless she has some defense. 14o Some jurisdictions provide such a defense
where the mother believed that relocation was the only way to protect her
child from exposure to domestic violence but only if the mother herself is a
victim or has a reasonable fear of becoming a victim of domestic
violence. 14J Fleeing with children therefore presents greater risk of
incurring criminal penalties than fleeing without them. Obviously, seeking
a court determination that relocation is in the best interests of the children
and an additional court order to maintain confidentiality of the mother's
address is the ideal solution in such a situation. However, as mentioned
earlier, the emergency situation presented by abuse tends to make this kind
of planning ahead difficult. In addition, the abuser's bargaining power in
child custody disputes may be greater than the victim's, preventing her
from seeking modification of child custody to relocate in secrecy.
C. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Interstate relocation with children presents jurisdictional issues when
the victim of domestic violence seeks a custody or support order from the
court in her new state or when the abuser goes to court in the original state.
In states that have enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), the victim of domestic violence has an
advantage.
Under section 204, a court may exercise "emergency
jurisdiction" where there is a showing of abuse. 142 The victim of domestic
violence thus may take advantage of the courts in her jurisdiction to bring
custody and support actions, rather than returning to her original state.
One case further explores jurisdictional issues in the context of
domestic violence and child custody disputes. In In re Marriage of
Stoneman,143 the Supreme Court of Montana found that a trial court should
have declined jurisdiction where, among other things, the protection of the
parties was an issue. 144 In that case, the mother and her children had
relocated to Washington to escape the abusive father. 145 The custody
139. Klein, supra note 124, at 118.
140. Id. at 119.
141. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(b) (2007).
142. Klein, supra note 124, at 113.
143. 64 P.3d 997 (Mont. 2003).
144. !d. at 998-99.
145. !d. at 998.
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arrangement allowed the father supervised visitation at a location in
Washington. 146 When the father challenged the custody arrangement in
Montana, the mother requested that the court decline jurisdiction as an
inconvenient forum. I47 The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the request, and found that protecting the mother and
children from abuse justified, in part, a finding of an inconvenient forum,
and that the trial court's failure to take into account this requirement under
Montana's adoption of the UCCJEA was improper.I48 The UCCJEA, as
the Court noted, places domestic violence at the top of the list of factors
that a court should consider in determining an inconvenient forum. 149
This case suggests that combining the UCCJEA provisions for
inconvenient forum with state ACPs and other confidentiality measures
may help victims fleeing interstate to apply the confidentiality rules of a
favorable forum to their custody cases. The UCCJEA provisions would
eradicate the need for a victim to rely on a foreign court giving Full Faith
and Credit to the confidentiality determinations of the victim's new home
state, which the court may be disinclined to do absent making independent
factual determinations on the extent and risk of continuing abuse.
Decreasing the scope of discretion that courts have to order disclosure may
also provide the victim greater assurance that her new address and identity
will be protected, thus encouraging a victim to take advantage of the
proffered statutory assistance and stop the abuse.
D. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
All of the remedies discussed above also apply to children when the
mother is a victim of domestic violence and applies on behalf of the child.
However, when children are involved, the applicant for a name change or
to the ACP must also show that confidentiality is in the child's best
interest. ISO
A showing of domestic violence usually satisfies this
evidentiary burden, although some states may require more. Thus, in states
with ACPs that normally do not require any evidence of domestic violence
(for example, Florida, Washington, and Massachusetts), the applicant must
actually make such a showing if she is filing on behalf of a minor child. lSI
However, the domestic violence need only be committed against the
mother, as exposure to domestic violence is usually sufficient grounds for
the child to enter the ACP.
Once a child is enrolled in an ACP, courts appear much more likely to
protect that child's location from discovery by third parties. For example,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Stoneman,64 PJd at 999.
/d.
/d. at 1000. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108(1) (2006).
Stoneman, 64 PJd at 1002.
65 C.J.S. Names § 23 (2007).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4) (2007).
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in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,152 a court protected a foster
child's location from discovery, fmding that the child's right to confidentiality
was absolute and not subject to any "interpretations" of the Act's exemptions
that were suggested by the parties. As with victims, the most challenging part
of using the ACP is getting into the program in the first instance. Once within
the program, children especially are protected by the confidentiality provisions.

IV. MOVING FOR CHANGE
This Note has pointed out several issues arising from eXlstmg
confidentiality programs, particularly ACPs, that need significant reform
before they can be effectively and safely utilized by victims of domestic
violence who are fleeing their abusers. This last section will discuss some of
the shapes that reform can take.
One student commentator has suggested implementing a "Family
Relocation Program," modeled after the Federal Witness Protection Program,
thus shifting the responsibility of finding and maintaining housing and other
living necessities from the victim to the government. 153 In this program, a
judge would hold a hearing to determine whether the victim is eligible for
protection, by looking at such factors as resolution of all familial legal issues
(e.g., dissolution, custody, and support), the potential for future acts of
violence, and whether the hearing comported with due process by providing
adequate notice to the abuser. 154 While such a program would not protect
against the abuse of every kind of batterer,155 it would provide a victim of
domestic violence with a new name, social security number, birth certificate,
housing, transportation, and, of course, confidentiality. 156 A victim could
remain in the program until the abuser "was no longer a threat," possibly
lasting into eternity. 157 Meanwhile, the woman could rely on the government
to protect her from her abuser, keep her identity confidential, and move on
with her life.
One advantage of such a program is to shift the economic burden of flight
from the victim of domestic violence to the government that had so far failed
to protect her. Another is that it encourages uniformity of application by
creating federal standards for protecting the confidential information of
relocating victims of domestic violence; a uniformity that is sadly lacking in
current attempts to help fleeing victims.
152. No. 01 CA55, 2002 WL 31341083 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2002).
153. Paul S. Haberman, Note, Before Death, We Must Part: Relocation and
Protection for Domestic Violence Victims in Volatile Divorce alld Custody Situations, 43
FAM. CT. REV. 149, 153-54 (2005).
154. Id. at 151.
155. Id. at 151.
156. Id. at 154.
157. Id. at 153. However, Haberman suggests that because the program only protects
against a single abuser, indefinite protection is likely unnecessary, unlike the protection
needed for witnesses of mob family crimes. !d.
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However, there are several problems with this rather innovative idea.
First, the government may not be able or willing to spend the amount of
money necessary to assist the potentially large class of victims of domestic
violence who are fleeing their abusers and who seek confidential
locations. 158 Second, attempts to move the inertia of government in the
direction of welfare and domestic violence reform have met with little
success absent a perceived national crisis. 159 Overcoming legislative
inertia may generally prove to be the most significant barrier to reform in
this area of the law. Other significant issues are that the Family Relocation
Program does not have debt collection mechanisms in place to collect child
or spousal support for the participant,160 it does not protect the victim's
family or relatives from the abuser's attacks or retaliation,161 it requires the
victim to be at the end of her domestic relations process (even though
victims just as often may be at the beginning of that process when they are
running from the emergency presented by domestic abuse), and it has
insufficient procedures for reevaluating the need for continued placement
in the program. Thus, while creative and perhaps helpful on an individual
level, a Family Relocation Program may simply be too unwieldy and
expensive to help alleviate the widespread problem of domestic violence
and its victims.
Federalization of this area of the law would provide a much-needed
uniformity for women fleeing out-of-state from domestic violence. As
noted, only thirty-one states currently have ACPs, fewer have name change
statutes, and almost none provide governmental assistance for relocation.
Moreover, no state has explicit provisions for dealing with out-of-state
protective orders, even though such protective orders are sometimes
necessary to apply to an ACP.
Because federalization may meet with state resistance and
constitutional commerce clause concerns,162 another approach with similar
effect is to promote a uniform law, as developed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As a starting point
for such a uniform law, combining the UCCJEA and ACPs for victims with
children fleeing domestic violence would help assist in the child custody
and support process while maintaining confidentiality. A uniform law must
also provide the same procedures and evidentiary requirements in each
state, preferably striking a balance between the rigorous and deterring
procedures of Rhode Island and Indiana and the overly trusting procedures
158. Habennan, supra note 153, at ISS.
159. Id. at 156.
160. Id. at 156-57 (noting that the problems with debt collection also run the other
way, when creditors attempt to collect debts from the protected participant).
161. /d. at 157.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that part of
V A WA was constitutionally invalid as going too far beyond Congress' legitimate commerce
clause powers).
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of Washington. Further, the unifonn law could begin to integrate
procedures on name changes and Public Records Acts exemptions to create
a more comprehensive program to protect the confidential identity of a
woman fleeing domestic violence. The unifonn law should clearly
delineate the procedures by which a state will give Full Faith and Credit to
the ACP determinations of another state, both for purposes of admitting the
woman into the new state's ACP and for enforcing prior court orders for
protection, custody, or support without revealing the woman's whereabouts
and identity. Although a unifonn law is neither an immediate nor a perfect
solution, its development could help encourage those states without ACPs
to consider implementing one while bringing awareness to a problem that is
too often brushed aside, or published in a court document or newspaper for
the abuser to discover.
While the ACP presents a much more streamlined approach than
fonner attempts to aid fleeing victims, it is a beginning, not an end.
Funding domestic violence centers that can provide assistance to victims,
like what is anticipated by California's ACP, would help prevent fraudulent
applications by allowing the advocates at such centers to do a preliminary
credibility analysis, would increase the efficiency of the application
process, and would provide much needed support, both emotionally and
legally, to the fleeing victim. Encouraging courts to pennit presumptions
of abuse for participants in ACPs where the ACP demands some
heightened proof of domestic violence (as in Rhode Island or Indiana, and
perhaps even as in California and New Jersey) could help victims who need
to continue interaction through the court system keep their names and
addresses confidential without having to satisfy the evidentiary burden of
proving domestic violence and continuing fear. After all, the purpose of
ACPs is to eliminate this fear, such that mandating disclosure without the
requisite "realistic fear" of future violence 163 verily defeats the goal of the
ACP. Including statutory guidelines that phase out the "realistic fear" of
future violence requirement over the period the woman participates in the
ACP may help resolve this somewhat illogical gap between the statutory
and common law.
Finally, the legal community can provide a great service by simply
educating other members, clients, and the public generally about the hann
caused by domestic violence, to both individuals and society, and the
available remedies for helping victims escape the cycle of abuse and begin
life again. Pamphlets, articles, editorials, and word-of-mouth can help
increase awareness of this problem and the ways each person can help
effect a solution, both by respecting the victim's confidentiality and
generating support for more widespread refonn.

163. Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710 (N.J. 2003).
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V. CONCLUSION: MOVING OUT
Victims of domestic violence who seek to flee their abusers by
relocating and changing their identities can find some support in state
statutes that allow them to maintain confidentiality. ACPs enacted in
thirty-one states have proved a valuable resource for victims of domestic
violence. Confidential name change statutes provide an additional tool for
fleeing an abuser, although they are in effect in far fewer states. Public
Records exemptions continue to promote respect for the confidential needs
of the victim. Nonetheless, this area of the law needs significant legal
reform. In balancing the important and legitimate governmental interests in
public records and limiting fraudulent uses of confidential programs with
the important and legitimate desire of a victim of domestic violence to
escape abuse, a state reforming its confidentiality laws and policies should
keep in mind the very real effects of domestic violence on an individualeffects that include physical bruising, emotional scarring, and even death.
Uniformity of the laws in this area, as well as actual application of such
laws in every state, would greatly increase the opportunity for a victim of
domestic violence to start a new life. Utilizing existing structures like
domestic violence shelters and clinics to promote and implement existing
ACPs and name change statutes would help streamline the relocation
process for the victim of domestic violence. Lastly, it is important to
promote a respect for victims, now survivors, of domestic violence, and
encourage them through education and outreach to take advantage of every
opportunity available to start a new life.

